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sides. After two years of consideration, however, within
the AAUP itself the issue was resolved in favor of equal
monthly benefits for equal contributions: women retirees, many of whom would live fewer months than most
men, and most of whom would live no greater number
of months than most men, were not to be personally
disadvantaged despite the fact that women retirees as a
total class exhibit a validated statistical characteristic
(not subject to more individualized determination) of
greater life expectancy.
The disagreement within the Association regarding
the proper policy nonetheless continued to be reflected
in the disagreements of others: e.g., sociologists, economists, actuaries, biologists, various groups of employees
and employers, and the courts. From a legal perspective, the debate was largely indistinguishable from
earlier controversiesinvolving the permissible or impermissible use of race-related or sex-related differences of
measurable statistical significance. The general dispute
was of long-standing familiarity to students of equal
protection theory: does the principle of equal protection focus upon an entitlement to equal treatment as
an individual, in disregard of a statistically significant
difference that holds for a group with which the
individual can be identified by an immutable characteristic but that is nonetheless not true of the majority of
persons within that class? Or does the principle focus
upon an entitlement to equal treatment fully cognizant
of statistically significant personal characteristics employed to provide parity between groups?
In matters of race, it was already substantially well
established as a legal matter that a person might not be
individually disadvantaged even under circumstances
where significant statistical differences were readily ascertainable between or among racial groupings. In matters of sex, the social and legal traditionwas undergoing
WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE is Professor of Law at change- but clearly moving in the same direction as
Duke University and a past President of the Associa- the laws which already disallowed such disadvantaging
tion.
distinctions to be drawn according to race even when

A little more than two years ago, the AAUP entered an
emerging dispute with TIAA-CREF, by far the largest
insurance carrier in higher education. The question at
issue was whether women who contribute the same
amount as men should also receive the same monthly
benefits as men who retire at the same age. The view
which prevailed within the AAUP emphasized the fact
that most women do not outlive most men; accordingly,
"
it was deemed to be unfair to penalize" all women
because of a class characteristic which in fact would
describe the status of but a minority of women. The
view which did not prevail within the Association emphasized that women as a group enjoy a significantly
greater life expectancy than men as a group; accordingly, it was deemed to be unfair to return more benefits to women as a class than to men as a class, i.e., to
"penalize" men in compelling them, in this sense, to
"subsidize" women.
Both sides to this controversy offered highly attractive analogies for the good sense of their position. Few
of those supporting equal monthly benefits for women
were prepared to disallow age from being taken into
account in determining the amount of payment to be
made each month between two persons with identical
aggregate contributions but retiring at different ages.
On the other hand, few on the other side were prepared
to allow race to be taken into account even in areas of
insurance where the comparable cohorts of insured persons, grouped by race, exhibited significantly different
life expectancies. Yet, in both these instances, similar
observations for both sides of the argument could
equivalently be offered. The disagreement as to which
approach was more equitable with regard to sex was
generally (although not uniformly) an honorable one,
argued in good faith among bright people on both
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such distinctions were carefully related to aggregated,
statistically accurate, statistically validated group differences. A review of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
particularly of Title VII, seemed to be professionally
instructive. On the face of the statute, Congress appeared to have resolved this controversy, at least in the
field of employment: certain categories (namely, race,
religion, national origin and sex) were believed by Congress to operate with such overall unfairness to individuals grouped in such ways for differential treatment by
employers, that such uses should be prohibited at least
as a general proposition. To be sure, as in nearly all
legal controversies Title VII was open to other possible
interpretations,and, indeed, other interpretations were
brought forward with considerable skill.
On April 25, 1978, a significant part of the disagreement was terminated for most practical purposes
by decision of the Supreme Court in City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart. What
the Court held, and what it implied for universities as
employers, should be of considerable interest. I shall
treat the Manhart decision in two parts. First, a brief
review of the case and of its holding. Second, some
personal conjecturesregarding the probable application
of Title VII to universities as employers, with particular
reference to their relationships with TIAA-CREF.
A Summary and Explanation of Manhart
The case arose under 42 U.S. Code §2000e-2(a) (1)
which provides:

propositions by the Court: (a) the statute focuses upon
protection of individuals; (b) it forbids disadvantage to
the individual when resulting entirely from the individual's sex (or race, religion, or national origin); (c) it
disallows disadvantage to the individual even when
based on a correct observation of difference about such
persons who, when lumped in with others by sex (race,
etc.) would as a class not be treated disadvantageously
but exactly equally; and (d) it disallows such disadvantaging of each individual of whom the class characteristic cannot be shown to be true even under circumstances where it will not be possible to foretell
whether the class characteristicwill, or will not, be true
of the individual. The essence of the case is contained
in the following excerpt:
"The statutemakesit unlawful"to discriminateagainst
any individualwith respect to his compensation... because of such individual'srace,color,religion,sex, or national origin. . . . The statute'sfocus on the individualis
unambiguous.. . . Even a true generalizationabout the
classis an insufficientreasonfor disqualifyingan individual
to whom the generalizationdoes not apply [Emphasis
added].
It is true that insuranceis concernedwith events that are
individuallyunpredictable,but that is characteristicof
manyemploymentdecisions.Individualrisks,like individual performance,maynot be predictedby resortto classificationsproscribedby TitleVII.[98 S. Ct. pp. 1340,1775-76
(1978)]

The outcome of the case should not have been starto anyone, in my opinion, except for the sheer
tling
It shall be an unlawfulemploymentpracticefor an emof actuarial habits persisting even after
ubiquitousness
with
reindividual
discriminate
to
...
againstany
ployer
of
the
enactment
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The majority
spect to his compensation,terms,conditions,or privileges
of women in any given cohort do not in fact live longer
of employment,becauseof such individual'ssex. . . .
than the majority of men of an equivalent cohort: i.e.,
The case itself was a class action brought in behalf of the majority of a group of 1,000 women retiring at age
female employees of the Los Angeles Department of sixty-five can be paired against the majorityof a group
Water and Power. In respect to the compensation of of 1,000 men retiring at the same age, in terms of the
such employees, each female received exactly equal age at which they die. From this perspective, the effect
monthly retirement payments from the Department's of the actuarial grouping by sex is to compel an intrapension fund as males of the same age, seniority, and group subsidy among women: all women are compelled
salary. Each female, however, was made to contribute to contribute more to a retirement fund than any man is
slightly more each month than was required of each required to contribute because some women will live
male. The larger monthly contributionrequired of each longer than most women and most men. (Alternatively,
female employee was actuarially accurate inasmuch as as in the TIAA-CREF situation, all women will receive
the retired female employees as a class had a life expec- less per month than any man will receive each month
tancy longer than that of male employees retiring at the following retirement, because particular women will
same age. As the monthly retirement benefit was paid live longer than most other women and most men.) The
to each employee until death, and as women retiring at disadvantaging of individuals because of their sex is
the same age as men did, as a total class, "outlive" men, forbidden by Title VII. Accordingly, the essence of the
the difference in the larger sum each female was made holding in Manhart is quite straightforward:a person
to contribute into the pension fund was an accurate may not be singled out by sex for the purpose of imposstatistical reflection of the larger aggregate monthly ing a greater burden (higher contributions into a fund)
benefits women retirees would receive as a class. Never- or for the purpose of denying an equal benefit (lower
theless, the Supreme Court held the plan to violate monthly payments from the fund) because of a characTitle VII. From the date of the decision (April 25, teristic statistically identifiable to the group (greaterlife
1978), unequal contributions may no longer be re- expectancy of women) but empirically false in respect
quired as a condition of eligibility for equal monthly to the majority of individual members within that
benefit payments.
group.
Indeed, had the subject matter of the case been
The key to the decision is the following series of
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anything other than insurance, it is implausible to suppose that the issue would have been felt worth contesting. A single illustration may suffice. Suppose it to
be true that in a given large employer's work force it
happened to be the case that the turnover among female or among black workers were 15 per cent higher
than among male or among white workers. Suppose
also that, from the employer*s point of view, this accurately translated into added business expenses for the
employer exactly equal to five cents per hour "average"
extra cost per female or per black worker. Though the
"average" cost to the employer in respect to its female
or black work-force cohort is thus five cents per hour
per female or black employee more than the average
cost per male or white employee, Title VII disallows the
employer to offset that expense by paying each female
or each black employee five cents per hour less than he
pays each male or each white. What is a true observation of each person viewed solely as a member of a
statistically significant class will manifestly not be true
of each member of that class when considered individually. It will not even be true of a majority of the
members of that class as individuals. At the same time,
neither is there any feasible way for the employer to
refine his extra costs per employee on an individual
basis, i.e., at the time of hiring there is no efficient (and
feasibly inexpensive) "test" pursuant to which he can
accurately identify the individual female, black, male,
or white workers whose personal early drop-out will
account for the employer's added expense. The absence
of any such feasible individualized "cost accounting" in
no event, however, permits the employer to assign an
average cost to each female or to each black employee
as a substitute: a woman who individually cannot be
shown to be a source of added expense (and a majority
of whom will not in fact present such an added expense)
may not be paid a lesser wage than a man doing the
same work. Insofar as an employer would nonetheless
attempt to burden each such person by paying five
cents an hour less solely because of sex or race, it is a
practice precisely forbidden to the employer by Title
VII (and, in this illustration, by the Equal Pay Act as
well).
The Distinction between Employers and Insurance
Companies
I have been at some pains to reiterate the principle
confirmed by Manhart in order that its general application might be clear. The particular holding of the
Court was addressed, of course, only to the particular
facts of the case:
All that is at issue today is a requirement that men and
women make unequal contributions to an employer-operated pension fund. Nothing in our holding implies that it
would be unlawful for an employer to set aside equal
retirement contributions for each employee and let each
retiree purchase the largest benefit which his or her accumulated contributionscould command in the open market.
[98 S. Ct, p. 1380 (Emphasis added.)]

In clarification of this observation, the Court noted in
its footnote 33:
Title VII and the Equal Pay Act govern relations between
employees and their employer, not between employees and
third parties. [Idem. (Emphasis added.)]

The caveat was a sensible one. So far as Title VII is
concerned, insurance companies are not subject to its
prohibitions at all. So, too, with respect to the Equal
Pay Act. Whether an insurance company might have to
answer to certain policyholders under other statutes,
whether they might be reached as an "agent" of an
employer under Title VII (2000e[b]), or whether they
may not have to answer at all, however, does not displace the full applicability of Title VII to employers.
Where it is the employer's plan, whether that plan be
mandatory or whether it be optional, Title VII will
apply. The distinction may be shown in the following
illustrations:
Al. Oxbridge University has no on-campus parking
facilities at all. To preserve its green spaces, moreover,
Oxbridge is firmly resolved to maintain the status quo,
i.e., in no way whatever does it intend to make any
arrangements regarding parking. Unipark, Inc. is a
wholly independent corporation which happens to operate the only commercial parking facility convenient
to the Oxbridge campus. Unipark restricts access to
men only. Question: Is Oxbridge liable under Title VII
to its female employees?
A2. Suppose exactly the same case as in Al, except
that Unipark charges all women drivers fifty cents per
day more to park than it charges men, based on its
verified figures admittedly establishing that women
parkersas a group cost it an average of fifty cents more
per day to accommodate. Is Oxbridge liable to its female employees under Title VII?
Assuming you (correctly)answered both of the above
questions "No," compare each of the following cases:
Bl. Oxbridge withholds from each employee's pay
five dollars per week pursuant to its "mandatoryparking plan." Oxbridge matches each such mandatoryemployee contribution with a like sum. The resulting sum
is paid over to Unipark in exchange for which Unipark
issues parking stickers to all Oxbridge employees who
would otherwise be eligible to use Unipark's lot at its
standard commercial rate. But as women driversare not
eligible to use Unipark's lot under any circumstances
(see case Al above), Unipark issues no parking stickers
to any of Oxbridge's female employees. Is Oxbridge's
liability to its female employees under Title VII contingent on Unipark's liability?
B2. Same case as Bl, except that Unipark will extend
equal parking privileges to any female employee holding a Unipark sticker (issued pursuant to the Oxbridge
mandatory parking-fee plan), upon additional payment
by such employees of fifty cents at the parkingentrance
(as in case A2). Is Oxbridge liable to its female employees under Title VII?
B3. Because Unipark itself does not wish to collect
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any money at its parking entrance but wishes, rather, matched that sum with a like amount of its own to cover
simply to park only such cars as have Unipark stickers, the costs of owning and operating that lot while exOxbridge itself collects fifty cents per week more from cluding all female employees from its use solely beeach female employee than from each male employee, cause of their sex, liability under Title VII would be
paying the resulting aggregate amount to Unipark absolutely clear. Identically, Title VII will operate to
which then treats all employees identically. Is Oxbridge forbid Oxbridge from dealing with an outside company
liable to its female employees under Title VII?
whose policies would violate Title VII as applied to
B4. The Oxbridge plan in B3 is not mandatory, but Oxbridge itself vis-^-vis its own employees.
The Court's example in Manhart is not to the conentirely optional for each employee. It is, however, the
only parking plan which Oxbridge provides. Is Ox- trary. In that example, the employer sets aside equal
bridge liable to its female employees under Title VII? retirement contributions for each employee, regardless
Case Bl is actually the bellwether case in this series, of sex. All employees are treated identically by the
as in fact each succeeding case is but a less dramatic employer in respect to the trust fund thus accumulated
variation on Bl itself. One way of analyzing Bl is as by the employer: at the date of retirement, each emfollows. It is superficiallylogical. It is also wholly incor- ployee withdraws a like lump sum, enabling each to go
rect.
out "in the open market" to purchase whatever some
First as to Oxbridge. Oxbridge has paid each of its third party is willing to sell them by way of an annuity,
employees equal pay for equal work. Similarly, it has at whatever price any third party may insist upon. That
withheld the same amount from each employee and it all such third parties might charge women more than
has matched each such amount, all without any dis- men, or that some such third parties might altogether
tinction or differences linked with the sex of any em- refuse to sell to women at any price, is regrettable but
ployee. Oxbridge has also negotiated the very best deal of no Title VII significance. It is of no greater signififor its employees which it was able to secure. The policy cance than when the employer pays his male and fepursuant to which female employees are barred is not a male employees equal take-home wages for equal work
policy approved or promulgated by Oxbridge. It is a in a community in which all of the local merchants
policy adopted, rather, solely by Unipark as a separate charge women a higher price for identical goods that
commercial concern, not answerable to Oxbridge's em- the merchants sell for less to men. The employer has
ployees because it is not their employer. We may even completely fulfilled its duty of strict nondiscrimination
suppose that Oxbridge protested in a good faith effortto among its employees. Nothing more is demanded by
secure a change in Unipark'spolicy, at least insofar as it Title VII. Title VII does not apply to merchants as
affected Oxbridge's employees, but that Unipark was vendors.
obdurate. Oxbridge, having treated all of its employees
Suppose, instead, that the employer wanted to proof
Unifor
the
not
the same "retirement plan" as that described
and
itself
vide
alike,
policy
responsible
liable
not
is
therefore
lacks
which
it
but with a single difference. Rather than accuover
control,
above,
park
for Unipark's discriminatory exclusion of Oxbridge's mulating the employee contributions in a trust account
held and managed by the employer, it wished instead
female employees.
to utilize a bank for that purpose. Again, however, the
for
the
univerIn
to
as
Second,
Unipark.
exchange
sity's payover of a weekly sum equal to ten dollars per bank will itself do exactly as the employer would itself
employee, as an independent contractor Unipark have done had the employer kept hold of the trust
agreed to do only what it said: to issue stickers to all of fund: i.e., when each employee reaches retirement age,
Oxbridge's employees otherwise eligible to park at its that employee will be paid by the bank the same lump
standard commercial rate. It has done all that it prom- sum he or she would have been authorized to withdraw
ised to do and, accordingly, Unipark is not liable either had the employer maintained control of the funds in its
to Oxbridge or to Oxbridge's female employees. "own" account. The plan thus furnished through the
Q.E.D.: neither Oxbridge nor Unipark is liable! Plau- third party (the bank) is truly "the same" as that fursible as this analysis may seem, a moment's reflection nished by the employer directly. No Title VII violation
(note what the women were compelled to contribute is involved. The fact that identical lump sums available
and yet what they received) should indicate how incor- from the bank to women retirees may not be as useful to
them as to men retirees (assuming all sellers of annuity
rect it is.
all
Bl
case
to
the
(and
Rather,
analyze
plans in the open market persist in discriminating
proper way
the ensuing cases) is quite simple. It involves a single against women) changes nothing.
To complete the picture, suppose instead that the
question: If the employer had himself furnished the
service, would he have been in compliance with Title employer's own plan requires equal contributions by
VII? If the answer is "yes," the employer is still in male and by female employees but at retirement time
compliance though he furnishes the same service pays out a smaller lump sum to females than to males.
through a third party. If the answer is "no" the em- Without doubt, Title VII is violated. Just so if the
ployer remains liable though he furnished the same "same plan" were furnished by the employer through a
third party. Thus, if the employer collected equal conservice through a third party.
In case Bl, had Oxbridge acquired a parking lot of its tributions from male and from female employees, paid
own, deducted five dollars from each employee's pay, over the sums to a bank, and the bank paid out at
SEPTEMBER
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retirement larger lump sums to male than to female
retirees, the employer remains fully liable under Title
VII. What the employer cannot do directly, the employer cannot do indirectly. If the employer cannot find
a third party agreeable to the employer's own duty of
nondiscrimination toward its employees, it has two
choices under Title VII: provide the service itself (on
nondiscriminatory terms) or abandon it altogether.
What an employer may not do, however, is to provide it
in any manner (including by arrangement with a third
party) which discriminates among the employer's own
employees by race, sex, religion, or national origin.
To return one last time to our list of Oxbridge hypotheticals, cases Al and A2, and cases Bl through B4, the
answers are clear and consistent. In cases Al and A2,
the employer provides no parking for anyone. It pays all
employees the same for the same work, without any
discrimination whatever. That its female employees
may experience serious problems at the hands of Unipark may well affect the morale of the Oxbridge female
employees. It may also be unfair. It may even be subject to redress under some other statutes. But it provides no evidence that Oxbridge itself discriminates
against its female employees. No more so than if Oxbridge furnished no dining facilities- and the only
commercial tearooms convenient to Oxbridge refused
service to men (or charged men higher prices).
In cases Bl through B4, however, Oxbridge is in
violation of Title VII. Oxbridge as an employer could
either furnish parking under its own auspices, on a
nondiscriminatory basis consistent with Title VII, or it
could deal with an outside parking company insofar as
that outside company would treat Oxbridge employees
as Oxbridge itself is under a Title VII duty to treat
them. None of its plans conforms in either way, however, and all are well calculated to result in successful
actions being brought against Oxbridge.
The AAUP, Universities as Employers,
and TIAA-CREF

If this analysis is sound, then it is easy to understand
the problem which universities can readily anticipate if
they continue to do business in the same way with
TIAA-CREF and if TIAA-CREF (and other carriers
who offer indistinguishable plans) does not at once
modify its practice of paying less per month to each
woman retiree than to each man retiree, though each
has the same accumulation as of the same retirement
date, under an employer-matching plan, whether mandatory or optional. It is quite clear that women employees making contributions identical to those of their
male counterparts after April 25, 1978 (the Manhart
decision was not made retroactive) must thereafter receive identical monthly payments insofar as they elect
the single-life annunity benefit. Failure of the employer
to bring this about will place the employer in violation
of Title VII.
It is less clear what alternatives are available to universities. The alternative the AAUP has preferred con-

templates a change in TIAA-CREF'sown policy. That
change would be to determine average life expectancy
of teachers and professors eligible for TIAA-CREF,
keyed of course to life expectancy of such persons at
such age as they may elect to claim the benefit of a
single-life annuity. In figuring that average life expectancy, TIAA-CREF may most certainly take into account the proportion of men and women within the
whole group. The individual premium charge for the
same single-life annuity paying the same monthly benefit, however, would not itself be different for men than
for women. In brief, a "merged table" prospectively
applied, is one answer.
Alternatively, although the AAUP has not favored
this solution, it is probably possible for universities as
employers to maintain the current arrangement with
TIAA-CREF with no change in TIAA-CREF policies,
but with the universities as employers contributing additional sums by way of "topping up" payments in
behalf of their women employees. Tested by the model
I have suggested earlier, I believe this would be a
legally permissible answer. For if a university were
literally a self-insurer, insofar as women were made to
contribute no more than men for a single-life annuity
paying equal monthly benefits from the date of retirement, presumably the manner in which the university
internally accounts to itself to produce this result is
without legal interest.
Some members of the AAUP, however, have expressed two reservations with this approach. First, it
may be a poor policy in the sense that it is calculated to
perpetuate divisiveness among male and female employees (the former being more inclined under this
approach to regard the latter as being "subsidized" at
"their" expense; the latter being more inclined to see in
the university's policy a sentiment that "women cost
more" as employees, a policy stigmatizing them and
suggesting an incentive for employers to discriminate
against them in hiring). As a policy, it has the same
unwelcome flavor as would be true if black academics
had shorter life expectancies than white academics
within the same university- and the policy of the university were to charge equal premiums for a life insurance benefit, "topping up" the premiums of blacks.
Second, it is not entirely free of legal questions. In
relation to TIAA-CREF, insofar as TIAA-CREFwould
continue to do business as usual but the university
would act to insure monthly benefits to women by
"topping up" the university's contribution on their behalf, the situation is just the same as in one of our
parking hypotheticals. In the case (B2) in which Unipark would permit women to park if, but only if, they
paid fifty cents more per day than each man (and also
held a parking sticker furnished through the university's mandatory parking plan pursuant to which the
university charges women the same as men for the
stickers), Oxbridge might have attempted to rescue its
plan by "topping up" its own payment to Unipark in
behalf of women. That is, Oxbridge would "bribe"
Unipark by paying Unipark fifty cents per day extra for
AAUP BULLETIN
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each woman employee eligible to park there, thus fulfilling its obligation that the same parking privilege is
available to women and to men all of whom had the
same amount withheld from their pay.
The possible legal objection is that, from one point of
view, while Title VII may be satisfied under such an
arrangement (in that male and female employees enjoy
identical, employer-furnished parking privileges for
identical contributions), a separate federal statute, the
Equal Pay Act, may now be violated. If one focuses
narrowlyon the sums of money the employer pays out
in consideration of each woman employee performing
the same work as a male counterpart, plainly it is a
larger sum. Viewed this way, men may complain that
they do not receive "equal pay" for "equal work."
Even so, the analysis is misplaced and almost certain
to fail. The proper test under the Equal Pay Act is not
cost to the employer, but benefit to the employee.
Women employees have no option to receive extra dollars for the same work; rather, they are entitled to
receive only the same benefit as men doing equal work.
That furnishing the same benefit to its women employees as to its men employees may cost the employer
more (because of third-party commercial practices
themselves not reachable either under Title VII or under the Equal Pay Act) is of no consequence. It is not
differentfrom the employer's distributing free groceries
on equal terms to all employees, after purchasing them
from an idiosyncratic wholesaler who charged the employer a price partly dependent upon the proportion of
men and women employed by that particularemployer.
Whatever the grievance of employees against the grocer (and they will need some statutory or constitutional
basis to do anything about it), they plainly have none
against the employer.
Thus, though it may not be the desirable long-term
solution (assuming that TIAA-CREF declines to alter
its practice), universities may presumably come into
conformity with the implications of Manhart by an

internal policy, prospective in character, of "topping
up" its contributions to assure women employees who
make equal contributions an entitlement to equal
monthly annuity benefits upon retirement.
The fact that this alternative is immediately available
to universities as employers, moreover, may also weigh
heavily against any insitution which is dilatory in making a change in its policy. Quite understandably, a
number of institutions may momentarily believe that
they are caught in a legal quandary. If TIAA-CREF
itself cannot be made legally answerable (an issue
which remains to be decided in the courts) and if it is
not practical to shift to another insurance carrieroffering otherwise comparable plans utilizing merged mortality tables, a university might very well conclude that
it has an adequate reason at law to defer any change
pending further legal developments. But insofar as the
"topping up" alternative is at once both legal and
available (and budget stringency from complying will
itself clearly not excuse a continuing violation of Title
VII), it is very unlikely that any such defense will be
accepted by the courts.
Conclusion
This article, like Manhart itself, has been unavoidably narrow. The reader may be rightly impatient
with the legalisms, the proliferation of hypothetical,
the excessive preoccupation with so slender a subject as
"single-life annuities." In drawing back from the subject, however, a second, wider view of the Manhartcase
may enlist the interest of the profession in much larger
issues. The tension in the Manhart case, it will be
recalled, was basically the tension between justice to
individuals considered personally, and justice to individuals considered as members of validly significant
groups. It is, in its way, a companion case to Bakke v.
The Regents of California. It may be worth pausing
over, to think through its comparisons with that preoccupying problem.

A response to this article by TIAA-CREF will be published in the next issue of the Bulletin.
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